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This panel is meant to examine policies to improve educational
outcomes, which I believe is everybody’s objective. It is certainly what the
country has been talking about for the last two decades, since it was
declared A Nation at Risk in 1983. During this time we have had a lot of
ﬂailing about. We have tried a lot of things and have had a lot of false
starts. There has been a great deal of activity, and we have done a lot of
spending. We are still in the middle of this today. But we do not have
much improved achievement to show for what we have been up to these
past 19 years. You can ﬁnd very spotty evidence, but earlier sessions have
made clear that there is not a lot of conclusive evidence that learning
outcomes have improved much.
Going forward, what should we do differently? I think it is useful to
proceed with some kind of a theory of action, that is, some plausible
notion of what we think is most apt to drive the improved results that we
seek. Otherwise, we are bound for more ﬂailing about. While it is a
considerable over-simpliﬁcation, I have found it useful to think in terms
of four theories of action that I believe dominate the education-reform
arena today. I think that two of these theories have some promise. Two of
them do not, but we will nevertheless surely continue to use them. In the
real world, we commonly ﬁnd more than one of these theories operating
at the same time in a given place. It gets very complicated when you start
mixing and matching and coming up with hybrids. On the other hand,
that is the real world, and I think we are probably going to discover at the
end of the day that a hybrid will work better than any one of these
strategies taken alone.
*President, Thomas B. Fordham Foundation.Of the four theories that I think dominated the conference discussion,
two operate chieﬂy within the familiar framework of educational insti-
tutional arrangements and professions. The other two are driven mostly
from outside the familiar institutional arrangements, and they include
most of what we have been talking about at this conference. These
outer-driven strategies are highly behaviorist. They presume that if you
push from outside the system, people inside the system will begin to
behave differently. Because they are highly behaviorist, I assume that
they will be especially appealing to economists, just as they are deeply
repugnant to most educators, not including myself.
The ﬁrst theory of action is the oldest, the most familiar, and it is
barely a changed system or strategy—just trusting the system to do a
better job with additional resources. The assumption is that the school
board and the superintendent want to do better, know how to do better,
and would successfully improve student achievement, if only they had
the wherewithal. This theory leads to a wide variety of resource-based
strategies, such as smaller classes, longer school days, new textbooks,
more technology, and so on.
The second theory of action, highly popular within the education
ﬁeld, I call, “trust the experts.” The idea is that education experts, such as
researchers, professors, gurus, and some of the people in this room,
would know how to make the system work better, if only they had
greater inﬂuence over it. Therefore, if we give them more inﬂuence, the
results will improve. This seeks either to give more power to experts or
to bring greater expertise to bear on what schools do. Examples of
implementations of this strategy include installation in a school of a
whole new comprehensive school design devised by somebody like Jim
Comer, Mark Tucker, or Howard Gardner; or the introduction of math-
education experts to retrain fourth-grade teachers in a school so they can
do a better job of teaching math. Warren Simmons and his colleagues are
much involved with some of these kinds of activities under the Annen-
berg aegis and have been doing quite a lot of this for the last decade or
so.
The third theory, which had most of the discussion at this conference
because it is the most visible reform strategy in America today, I would
call, “trust the government.” It assumes that a state government, with a
lot of “oomph” added by the federal government, will set standards,
develop tests, and impose consequences on the education system, causing
the people within the system to teach better, study harder, learn more,
and so on. This strategy involves statewide academic standards and tests
or assessments. If it is fully ﬂedged, it also normally involves rewards and
interventions or punishments, with the rewards going to those who meet
the standards—be they students, schools, or educators—and with the
interventions or punishments going to those who do not—to those who
need to work harder or have their behavior changed in some way. You
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tendent, or do some other intervention, or many other interventions, as
cataloged with great precision year by year in the No Child Left Behind
Act. The theory is that the government will create what a colleague called
a kind of exoskeleton around this soft body of the education system and
will thus cause it to shape up in a way that it would not do on its own.
The fourth strategy is, of course, competition and choice. This
strategy also comes from outside the system, but it comes from the
customers, from the marketplace, from, as it were, the bottom up rather
than the top down. The theory, familiar to economists and others, is that
the system will improve if it has competition; efﬁciency, quality, produc-
tivity, and performance will improve if there are choices, diversity, and
marketplace forces at work. Theoretically this strategy will not only
beneﬁt the kids who are directly served by these alternative arrange-
ments—typically low-income kids who otherwise would be trapped in
failing, urban school systems—but will also tone up the whole system by
virtue of the competition that is brought to bear upon it. This theory leads
to charter schools, to vouchers, and to a myriad of other arrangements
that come under the heading of competition and choice.
My evaluation of these four theories is as follows. I have very little
conﬁdence in trusting the system to do more with additional resources.
There are occasional ﬂuky situations where that strategy works, espe-
cially if really inspired leadership exists at a state, a district, or even a
school building level. But these cases are rare. I also do not have a lot of
conﬁdence in trusting the experts to ﬁx the system, though often expertise
is needed within or in combination with one of these other strategies, as
was discussed by Ellen Guiney, among others. The question, however, is
whom do you trust to have the leverage to make things change? The
experts are not the answer to that question. I do have a fair amount of
conﬁdence in the exoskeleton, the government-based, standards-based
approach. But it is extremely difﬁcult to implement successfully: to get the
standards right, to get the tests right, to get the consequences in place,
and so on. I also have a fair degree of optimism about the competition
system, but its politics are so gnarly that we have not even given it a
proper test, let alone given it a full-ﬂedged endorsement as a reform
strategy.
So where do we end up? Probably the most interesting example in
front of us is the charter school phenomenon, which is a hybrid of
strategies three and four. Charter schools combine accountability, tests,
and information on the one hand, with diversity, competition, pluralism,
and choice on the other hand. With 2,400 charter schools, heading rapidly
toward 3,000, we have the beginnings of a naturally occurring experiment
at the intersection of strategies three and four, and one that incidentally
draws in a lot of expertise. A good charter school often has some inspired
educators working on some very interesting ideas. It is simultaneously
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by the state test and to its customers. Because nobody has to attend them,
charter schools will have no students—and no revenue—if nobody
chooses to go to them.
Like Eric Hanushek, I would like to suggest that the standards-based,
or government-driven, system and the market system might even need
each other. Each of them by itself supplies a solution to the biggest
problem besetting the other one. The market by itself lacks informed
consumers, a problem that can be solved by government standards and
tests. The government-driven accountability system is very good at
identifying failing schools, but it is lousy at doing anything about them,
for which the choice system may hold the solution. I have hopes about
these two strategies working in combination as we go forward, and I
think we are beginning to learn quite a lot about them from the charter
school experience.
I used to assume that school inevitably meant a grown-up in a room
with four walls and 20 little people. The most interesting thing that I am
involved with right now, along with former education secretary Bill
Bennett, is a private start-up called K–12 (K12.com) that is seeking to
create a virtual school for the country and potentially for the world, with
thousands of kids to be enrolled by September. When you begin to think
through the implications of a virtual school, everything changes: the
deﬁnition of a school, of a teacher, of a school day, of a learning
environment, of what it means to be in third grade, and so on. I want to
suggest that we might ﬁnd ourselves, with the help of technology,
actually catapulting over a lot of the institutional arrangements that have
been so frustrating, exacerbating, and perplexing as we try to reform the
system that we have today.
294 Chester E. Finn, Jr.